• Why OT Defenses Often Start Too Late Industrial organizations are facing a growing paradox in cybersecurity. • While operational technology (OT) environments are increasingly connected, most security strategies still assume threats will only materialize once attackers reach the plant floor. • In reality, attacks that disrupt industrial operations rarely begin in OT environments. • They originate upstream, progress over time and frequently exploit the persistent assumption of isolation. • This shift fundamentally changes how defenders must think about visibility, detection and response across Information Technology (IT) and OT domains. • Recent joint research by Palo Alto Networks OT Threat Research Lab, Siemens Cybersecurity Lab and the Idaho National Laboratory challenges several long-held assumptions about how OT attacks originate, evolve and can be stopped.

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  • Summary

A joint study by Palo Alto Networks, Siemens, and Idaho National Laboratory reveals that most attacks disrupting operational technology (OT) systems actually begin in the IT domain, not within OT itself. The research shows that 70 % of OT‑related incidents originate from IT environments, exploiting familiar tactics such as credential abuse and brute‑force attacks before moving across shared identity systems. The findings highlight the network edge-where IT and OT converge-as a critical point for early detection and defense. With a 332 % rise in publicly exposed OT devices between 2023 and 2024, the study argues that defenders can gain valuable time by focusing on edge‑driven, predictive security operations, turning potential latency into a strategic advantage.

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