• Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory [Submitted on 17 Feb 2026] Title:Bloc Voting on Single Peaked Preferences View PDF HTML (experimental)Abstract:We analyze the winning coalitions that arise under Bloc voting when voters preferences are single-peaked. • For small numbers of candidates and numbers of winners, we determine conditions under which candidates in winning coalitions are adjacent. • We also analyze the results of pairwise contests between winning and losing candidates and assess when the winning coalitions satisfy several proposed extensions of the Condorcet criterion to multiwinner voting methods. • Finally, we use Monte Carlo simulations to investigate how frequently these coalitions arise under different assumptions about voter behavior. • References & Citations export BibTeX citation Loading… • Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv (What is alphaXiv?) CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers (What is CatalyzeX?) DagsHub (What is DagsHub?) Gotit.pub (What is GotitPub?) Hugging Face (What is Huggingface?) Papers with Code (What is Papers with Code?) ScienceCast (What is ScienceCast?) Demos Recommenders and Search Tools Influence Flower (What are Influence Flowers?) CORE Recommender (What is CORE?) arXivLabs: experimental projects with community

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  • Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory [Submitted on 17 Feb 2026] Title:Bloc Voting on Single Peaked Preferences View PDF HTML (experimental)Abstract:We analyze the winning coalitions that arise under Bloc voting when voters preferences are single-peaked. For small numbers of candidates and numbers of winners, we determine conditions under which candidates in winning coalitions are adjacent. We also analyze the results of pairwise contests between winning and losing candidates and assess when the winning coalitions satisfy several proposed extensions of the Condorcet criterion to

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